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I. INTRODUCTION
"Our duty, in short, is to see that important legislative purposes, heralded
in the halls of Congress, are not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of
the federal bureaucracy. "
When an environmental planner develops an impact statement under
the National Environmental Policy Act, when a social services planner
develops a comprehensive plan under Title XX of the Social Security Act,
when a land use planner prepares a comprehensive plan under state land
use enabling laws, all are acting under a law of planning, fragmented
though it may be. My belief in the importance of formulating a jurisprud-
ence of planning is based upon an undoubtedly biased assumption after
years of working with the legal problems of that area. There has been a
subtle rise in the relative power of a new elite, the administrator planner.
This planner is part of the changing system of governance in America. By
no means unified as a class, planners have increased in numbers and
acquired increased influence. The legal system presently is seeking to cope
with the rise in power of this new elite, and is having difficulty doing so
because of the failure of "law people" to fully understand the uses and
abuses of the methods and techniques which planners employ.2 This lack
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). For further study of this case, see D. HAGMAN, URBAN AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT 982-91 (1973); THE WATER'S EDGE: CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE COASTAL ZONE 239-
40 (B. Ketchum ed. 1972); Banfield, Calvert Cliffs' Decision Requires Agencies to Get Tough
with Environmental Laws, 38 NAT'L J. 1925-33 (1971).
The Calvert Cliffs' case involved the role of environmental impact statements as required
by the National Environmental Policy Act. It is arguable whether these statements are, in
fact, "plans." Later in the text, planning is defined broadly to include impact statements and
other approaches to planning. For a collection of essays discussing the definition of planning,
see A. FALUDI, A READER IN PLANNING THEORY (1973).
1 For a discussion of the growth of executive power in the United States, see W. FRIEDMAN,
LAW IN A CHANGING Socir (1972). Friedman maintains that western law gives considerable
autonomy to the planning process. Id. at 375-97.
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of understanding is accompanied by a lag in the present structure of legal
institutions and legal concepts.
In addition to controlling this new elite, the legal system must be
reformed to ease the application of proper methods of planning. One exam-
ple of such reform is the current effort of courts to cope with the impact
planning statements required under the National Environmental Policy
Act. A tremendous growth of planning, planning techniques and applied
science has occurred in the past three decades. How these activities relate
to the legal system has been analyzed on a case by case basis, but no new
general view has emerged. This legal theory about planning must define
and identify the current activities of planning, past and future trends in
planning, and theories about planning. It must describe how law may
actually impede or help the planning process. Such a theory must not only
direct empirical studies of the relationships of law and planning, but also
explore the conceptual relationships between categories of planning meth-
ods and categories of legal reasoning.3
Most current legal theories are either very broad philosophies of law
or very specific rationales for a series of decisions within a particular field.
A "middle range" legal theory is required. A new legal theory would guide
descriptive and predictive studies within a view to a set of hopefully shared
goals. Studies would be conducted in a context in which law is viewed as
promoting rational planning within properly structured organizational set-
tings. Such planning would enable a community to guide its social change
while minimizing violent conflict.
In addition to a theory about the law of planning, a theory of the law
of planning is needed. The central problem of a theory of the law of plan-
ning revolves around the question: How can the law both facilitate and
control the planning system in order to secure justice?4 Problems of jus-
tice-the securing of fundamental fariness in procedure and result'-arise
within the planning system when the law seeks to allocate powers between
planners and others, chooses one rather than another method of rational
planning, institutionalizes several alternative structures for planning and
implementing plans, reviews planners' decisions regarding the appropriate
kind and rate of social change, and establishes the ways in which planners
should seek the appropriate balance among the needs of citizens, the
For one discussion of a comparison between modes of reasoning, see Weiler, Two Models of
Judicial Decision-Making, 46 CAN. B. REv. 406 (1968). See generally P. DIEsING, REASON IN
SociETY (1973).
Although it is beyond the scope of this article, a presumption of the article is that a listing
of individual goals, such as thatprovided by Laswell and McDougal, see Laswell & McDou-
gal, Criteria For a Theory About Law, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 360, 362-94 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Laswell & McDougal], is not sufficient to "explain" and justify legal activity. A
second assumption is that freedom is not the prime value but is one value to be allocated
against others. This allocation of values raises the problem of justice. See 0. BIRD, THE IDEA
OF JUSTICE (1967).
1 This definition is taken from J. RAw-s, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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claims of nature and the maximizing of freedom.'
It is the combination of the theory about the law of planning-the
descriptive and conceptual analysis-of the law regulating planning and the
theory of the law of planning-the normative exploration of the relation-
ship of the law of planning to justice which makes up a total jurisprudence
of planning,' and which requires detailed discussion.
II. THE NEED FOR A COMPLETE REEXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
PLANNING.
The need for a jurisprudence of planning is stimulated by the rapid
rise in the number and influence of planners, most of whom have a
technique-oriented perspective and are busy developing functional plans
which frequently ignore issues of justice, freedom and the creation of viable
communities. In the language of Jacque Ellul, we are witnessing the
triumph of "le technique" over other values that our legal system is de-
signed to protect. For those acquainted with the present legal structure for
planning in America, the disorganization of that structure contributes to
its failure to supervise the planning process. But the more fundamental
need for a jurisprudence of planning arises from the fact that the develop-
ment of sciences and their application through planning results in the
massive but silent reallocation of power. The activities of planners result-
ing from this reallocation may only be properly channelled through legal
processes which are guided, in turn, by a jurisprudence of planning.
A. The Rise of the Planner
The increase in the number of planners in the United States is easy
to document.8 The proliferation of planning-related legislation exemplifies
It may be properly argued that an underlying assumption of a jurisprudence of planning as
herein described is "rationalistic" insofar as the assumption is made that laws can be made
by man at least partially free from the constraints of history. Most commitments to planning
arise out of a commitment to socialism, which, in turn, is often derived from theories which
include basic beliefs in historical determinism. Yet, in a true sense, man can only plan
effectively if he is free from such forces. Mannheim recognized this in his Man and Society
in an Age of Reconstruction (1949). For a recent adaptation, see J. FRIEDMAN, RETRACKING
AMERICA (1971).
The careful descriptive study of the law of planning processes is in its infancy. It is largely
characterized by case studies which include legal aspects. Normative explorations of the law
of planning are almost nonexistent. A basic premise of this article is that legal materials
should be organized in broad normative frameworks, rather than according to legal doctrines
or codes.
I The growth of planners is discussed in Kaufman, Contemporary Planning Practice: State
of the Art, in PLANNING IN AMERICA: LEARNING FROM TURBULENCE 111 (D. Godschalk ed. 1974).
In this article, the following statistics are given: Two decades ago, AIP had about 1,000
members while ASPO "had some 1,700 with considerable overlapping in membership." Fewer
than 20 universities offered programs leading to the master's degree in planning, only one
offered a Ph.D. degree in planning. Id. at 113. Today AlP has some 10,000 members, a ten-
fold increase over its membership in 1954. ASPO has more than 11,000 members. Fifty
percent of ASPO's professional membership have planning degrees. Twenty percent hold at
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the growth of the formal authority, if not actual power, of planners., Per-
haps more germane evidence of the planners' power in local, state and
federal governments is the rise of the strong executive who often supports,
and is supported and advised by, planners.'0 The important role of plan-
ning within the large-scale organizations (public and private)," the grow-
ing role of applied science in production, and the increasing number of
"appliers" of science within the post industrial occupational structure con-
stitute indirect evidence for the proposition that the power of planners is
growing."
Recognition of the growing importance of the planner has been ob-
scured by past views of planning. In the late 1930's many had unrealisti-
cally high expectations that the United States would be dominated by
"technocrats." These expectations were not fulfilled. 3 Hundreds of case
studies revealed that plans were not carried out, and scholars of planning
often mistook the failure of plans forthe unimportance of planners." Such
least master's degrees in related areas. Sixty universities now offer programs leading to
master's degrees in planning; 15 offer Ph.D. degrees as well. Some 1,000 students received
master's degrees in planning in 1973 compared to less than 100 in 1954. Since 1960, 220 Ph.D.
degrees have. been granted; before 1960, the number of those holding Ph.D.'s could be counted
on one hand.
Thirteen thousand planners belonged to both ASPO and AIP in 1973 (with about 500
estimated not to be working for the governmental planning bodies). At least 3,500 planners
were estimated to work for public planning agencies, however, and not belong to either of the
two national planning organizations. Hence, about 16,000 planners work for government
planning agencies.
I The best source for a review of current planning legislation is Donald Hagman's text. See
note 1 supra. There is no codification of planning law. The American Law Institute has
developed a Model Land Development Code which deals only with land use planning. Unfor-
tunately, the conservative approach of the A.L.I. code towards planning makes it suffer in
comparison to the more advanced states of Florida, California and Colorado.
Originally, I had intended to list the "planning laws" by citation. Such a list, besides
being mammoth, would also be meaningless without extensive exploration. For example, are
agency "reports" a required part of the planning process? They could be part of the feedback
stage of planning. How about development of regulations? Such design of regulations may
be part of a well-organized planning process or it may be ad hoc decision making. Thus, the
actual implementation of these statutes may determine whether they are or are not "planning
statutes."
" For one of many discussions of the rise in power of the modern executive, see A. Scm.ESIN-
GER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973).
" Corporate planning is discussed and analyzed' in N. CHAMBERLAIN, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC
PLANNING (1965). For the constitutional implications of the growth of corporations and their
planning, see A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE (1973).
" This role of applied science is documented in detail in D. BELL, THE POST-INDUSTRIAL
SOCIETY (1973).
" For a history of this development, see M. Scor, AMERICAN CrrY PLANNING SINCE 1890
(1971). See also R. LAWSON, THE FAILURE OF INDEPENDENT LIBERALISM (1930-'1940) 39-91 (1972).
1 See H. KAPLAN, URBAN RENEWAL POLITICS: SLUM CLEARANCE IN NEWARK (1963); P. Rossi &
R. DENTLER, THE POLITICS OF URBAN RENEWAL: THE CHICAGO FINDINGS (1961); OFFICE OF COM-
MUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT, OFFICE OF, EVALUATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT Op
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, THE FUTURE OF LOCAL URBAN REDEVELOPMENT: A GUIDE FOR
COMMUNITY POLICY MAKERS. For a recent similar attack on planners, see C. HAAR, BETWEEN
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a mistake often missed the significant fact that planners were contributing
to public decisions-even if their plans were modified by other decision-
makers within a pluralistic political arena.
The fragmentation of planning structures also contributes to the
masking of planning's important role. Public and private corporate plan-
ning have proceeded along two different lines of development, with differ-
ent scholars viewing planning as either a wholly public or wholly private
activity. Public planning itself is fragmented into subdivisions of environ-
mental, economic, urban and social planning activities. This fragmenta-
tion results in documented studies of planning within various specialties
rather than the preparation of any comprehensive portrait of the field as a
whole."8
Planners and people writing about planning disagree about what plan-
ning is. Thus, many activities are regarded as planning by some but not
by others. Despite this difference of views, a general paradigm regarding
the appropriate planning method prevails in many planning circles. Al-
though interpreted differently by many planning theories, planning itself
is seen as:
1. Conjectures about future setting ... for which the working out of the
plan over time is relevant and desirable;
2. Analysis leading to goal setting;
3. Evaluation of the costs and benefits of alternative plans for goal setting;
4. Tracing out the consequences for the chosen plan of pertinent circum-
stances outside the plan's direct operating environment;
5. Laying out and carrying out sequenced chains of actions that define the
plan;
6. Evaluation of how the plan is working out on the basis of environmental
feedback that permits recycling of the above steps."6
As a result of their commitment to technical rationality, planners view
law from a technique-oriented perspective. With such a perspective, plan-
ners see the law as helping to organize and structure the planning task,
implement the plan, and legitimatize the planners' role. Viewed nega-
tively, the planner sees the law as contributing to the many institutional
barriers to effective planning. 7 Nor do they view the law as properly requir-
THE IDEA AND THE REALITY: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN, FATE AND LEGACY OF THE MODEL CITIES
PROGRAM (1975).
" There are, of course, examinations of the comprehensive planning process. See, e.g., T.
KENT, THE URBAN GENERAL PLAN (1964).
"1 This summary comes from D. MICHAEL, ON LEARNING TO PLAN AND PLANNING TO LEARN 45
(1973). Actually, Michael advances a much more sophisticated theory of planning in this
book.
11 Models of the relationship of law and planning remain to be developed. These models may
include: (1) the "product-plan-law command" model in which the law sanctions an arrived-
at plan; (2) the "process-plan-law command" model in which the law sanctions decisions
emerging out of a planning process; (3) the "command plan" by which the plan itself is a
sanctioned command; (4) the "law-plan implementing" model in which a non-sanctioned
plan implements a legal command; (5) the "legally authorized advisory plan"; and (6) the
"field structured plan" implemented by legal structuring of "a field" to implement the plan.
All of these and others can be developed and classified according to the legal status of the
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ing that planning be accountable to the people, or making certain that the
plan and the planning process protects individual freedoms, property and
the natural environment from plans and their consequent implementa-
tion." It is this technique-oriented perspective of the planner which has
contributed to the environmental' and relocation impacts of highways,
and the social injustice of relocation under urban renewal.2 0 This perspec-
tive has also helped to spawn suburban plans and zoning resulting in
unjust exclusion of certain groups."' Thus, it is the technique-oriented
perspectives of planners and their result which must be controlled through
the proper workings of institutions.
B. The Present Planning Structure
The domestic planning "system" is a partially integrated, federated
system of laws. At the national level, there is relatively little planning by
the legislature, 2 an example being the new Congressional Budget Commit-
tee." A national system of courts occasionally engages in indirect planning
through the use of "Brandeis" briefs24 or consultation with planners in the
implementation of court orders .2 Executive planning is conducted on the
plan itself, whether the plan implements the law or vice versa, and the kind of sanction
involved. Another approach is to inquire into the ways in which law and plan apply "reason"
to society, and the kind of reason to be applied. Planning and law may be seen as the
"applicators" of forms of theoretical knowledge to society, or they may be regarded as forms
of "practical reasoning" in themselves, in which some theoretical reasoning indirectly enters.
If the latter, then the question arises as to the difference in the reasoning process between
planning and law. For one discussion of that reasoning process, see LEVY, INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING.
" See Brooks, Beyond Advocacy and Towards Justice: The Contribution of Legal Reasoning
to Planning and Policy Making (American Institute of Planning 1972). One psychological
analysis of the planner's need to adopt such a technique-oriented perspective is set forth in
R. SENNEr, THE USES OF DISORDER: PERSONAL IDENTITY AND CITY LIFE (1970).
" Case histories document these impacts. See, e.g., A. ALTSHULER, THE CIT PLANNING PRO-
cESS: A POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1965).
20 L. KEYES, THE REHABILITATION PLANNING GAME: A STUDY IN THE DIVERSITY OF
NEIGHBORHOODS (1969); M. MEYERSON & E. BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING AND THE PUBuC
INTEREST: THE CASE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO (1955); C. NEEDLEMAN & M. NEEDLEMAN,
GUERILLAS IN THE BUREAUCRACY: THE COMMUNITY PLANNING EXPERIMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(1974); M. REIN & P. MARRIS, DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL REFORM: POVERTY AND COMMUNITY ACTION
IN THE UNITED STATES (1967).
"' See R. BABCOCK & F. BUSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND Hous-
ING IN THE 1970'S (1973); E. BERGMAN, ELIMINATING EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: RECONCILING WORK
PLACE AND RESIDENCE IN SUBURBAN AREAS (1974); A. DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS (1973);
L. MASOTTI & J. HADDEN, SUBURBIA IN TRANSITION 111-75 (1974).
2 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 2-68 (1975) which established research and evaluation func-
tions in the legislative council. This law, however, has been repealed.
n 31 U.S.C. § § 1301-1353 (1976). Section 1353 contains the planning functions of the Congres-
sional Budget Office.
I P. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1972). It may be argued that such briefs
are not "plans," although they embody many facets of planning, including an inventory of
problems, definitions of objectives and considerations of alternatives.
n For a detailed review of the role of the court in these matters, see E. Shapiro, The Court
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basis of laws requiring -planning either at the national26 or subnational
levels." These requirements are often a condition of grants-in-aid or part
of the regulatory system. Planning at the national level embraces environ-
mental, economic, transportation, criminal justice, housing, science, and
social security matters. There is also a raft of established advisory commit-
tees.h Although planning may be mandated by federal law, it is conducted
at a multi~state, state, regional or local level.2 Planning may also be part
of a regulatory scheme at the national or subnational level, such as the
planning required as part of the licensing of utilities, 3° the air and water
pollution control system,31 and even regulatory aspects of the welfare sys-
tem.32
Most federal planning is single subject functional planning, although
there are-notable exceptions which include the President's Domestic Coun-
cil, 13 the Office of Management and Budget14 and the Council of Economic
Advisors.3 The planning mandates established by law may be extremely
as a Housing Planner (1975) (MCP thesis, Univ. of Rhode Island). Shapiro also reviews the
court's role in planning city services, educational desegregation and mental health planning.
" See notes 32-33 infra. -
v See note 39 infra.
n The selection of the National Advisory Committee includes: Air Quality Advisory Board,
42 U.S.C. § 7417 (1976); Advisory Committee on Soil and Water Conservation, 7 U.S.C. §
1392 (1976); Water Pollution Prevention and Control Advisory Board, 33 U.S.C. § 1159
(1976); Urban Studies Fellowship Advisory Board, 20 U.S.C. § 802 (1976); Advisory Board
on Wildlife, 7 U.S.C. § 1838(p) (1976); Advisory Board on Job Corps, 42 U.S.C. § 2725 (1976);
Advisory Board on Wetland Preservation for Water Bank Program, 16 U.S.C. § 1306 (1976);
Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings and Monuments, 16 U.S.C. §
463 (1976); .Advisory Board on National Housing Partnerships, 42 U.S.C. § 3936 (1976).
21 See note 9 supra.
" For a detailed account of the legal matrix surrounding power plants licensing, see Brooks,
Millstone Two and the Rainbow: Planning Law and Environmental Protection, 4 CONN. L.
REv'. 54 (1971). See also FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 928-1019 (West 1974).
"' Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976).
"' Under Title 42 of the United States Code (1970), § 602 contains state plans for. aid to
dependent children, § 802 is concerned with state plans for social services to the aged and
blind, and § 2974 calls for the preparation of a 5-year national poverty action plan by the
Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity.
" The President's Domestic Council is composed of the: (1) President; (2) Vice President;
(3) Attorney General; (4) Sec'y of Agriculture; (5) Sec'y of Commerce; (6) Sec'y of HEW; (7)
Sec'y of the Interior; (8) Sec'y of HUD; (9) Sec'y of Labor; (10) Sec'y of Transportation; and
(11) Sec'y of the Treasury. See 5 U.S.C. § 903 (1970).
11 The Office of Management and Budget does the following planning-related, multi-
functioning programming: (1) economic opportunity program, jointly funded projects, au-
thority, administration, etc., see 42 U.S.C. § 2962 (1970), Exec. Order No. 11466; (2) flood
prevention and watershed protection, delegation of functions of President to Director of
OMB. 16 U.S.C. § 1005 (1970), Exec. Order No. 11512; (3) juvenile delinquency prevention
and control, jointly funded projects, authority, administration, etc., see 42 U.S.C. § 2962
(1970), Exec. Order No. 11466.
' 15 U.S.C. § 1023 (1976) establishes the Council of Economic Advisors to the President.
There are three members appointed by the President who will formulate and recommend
national economic policy "to promote employment, production, and purchasing power under
free competitive enterprise." For a discussion of their planning effectiveness, see H. WILEN-
SKY, ORANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (1967).
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broad and vague and, as in the case of federal power planning,N6 they may
be supplemented by administrative regulations or court interpretations, or
both. Planning may be more specifically set forth in statutory terms as in
some housing planning legislation 3 or environmental laws,s3 and may be
either a totally public activity or a joint public-private venture, such as
utility planning.
At the state level, planning activities may be required by federal law
and enabled by state law or authorized solely by state law.3 Alternatively,
the state may require or simply enable planning to take place at a substate
level.'" The state legislature and judiciary itself may engage in some
planning-like activities, but most of the planning is carried on by the
executive. State land use, utility site locations, energy, economic develop-
ment, criminal justice and welfare are just some of the subject matters
covered.
Regional and/or metropolitan planning may be required or enabled by
both the federal and/or the state governments. Transportation, solid waste,
land use, health, and criminal justice are just a few of the many planning
activities which are undertaken at the regional level."
At the local level, planning may be authorized by state and local
ordinances or may be required by the variety of federal and state grant-
in-aid programs either on a categorical basis or on a revenue-sharing
basis. 2 Local planning may be conducted by independent commissions or
by the executive and/or the advisory to the legislature.
There is no organizational plan for the present domestic planning
system. Very little attention has been directed to legislative 3 or judicial
16 U.S.C. §§ 791-828c (1976). The Federal Power Commission was interpreted to have
specific planning responsibilities under the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1976). See
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
', For a detailed planning format set forth in the statute, see Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
' See National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970); Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571 (1976).
For an excellent brief discussion of the alternative formats, indicating how this account is
necessarily oversimplified, see D. MANDELKE, MANAGING Oua URBAN ENVIRONMENT 1-31
(1971).
" Most planning and zoning enabling acts, housing authority laws, and laws establishing
local conservation commissions to plan environmentally fall into this category.
" Typical regional planning laws include: (1) R.I. GEN. LAWS § 46-16-8 in conjunction with
the New England Interstate Pollution Control Commission; (2) the Tahoe Regional Planning
Compact which includes parts of California and Nevada. See HAGMAN, supra note 1. This was
federally approved on December 18, 1969. See Pub. L. No. 91-148, 38 Stat. 360; (3) VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 6000 (1971); (4) Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. EXEc. LAw § 800 (McKin-
ney 1971). For a review of multistate regional planning, see M. DERTHICK, BErwEEN STATE AND
NATION (1974").
" See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5304 (1970) (community development).
'" For one discussion of legislative planning, see C. NUTMiNG & R. DICKERSON, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (5th ed. 1978).
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planning" or the relationship of planning within these branches to execu-
tive planning. No overall assessment has been made of joint public-private
planning," although attention has been given to utility, redevelopment,
economic development and new town planning. Discussions of the relation-
ships between different levels of government planning and between multi-
purpose and single purpose planning is sparse and unsatisfactory.
C. The Failures of Planning
The disorganized legal system of planning in the United States is not
feared, mainly because legal planning is believed to be ineffective. Most
case histories of planning in the United States are stories of failure." The
ineffectiveness of local master plans, 7 the decline and fall of the new towns
program of the 1930's,"8 the elimination of the. Natural Resources Planning
Board,"9 the disappointment with the urban renewal programs, 50 model
cities"' and anti-poverty programs," the demise of program planning and
budgeting systems5 3 and the Domestic Council,' and the recent close down
of the new towns programs makes for rather dismal reading.
The limits of resources available, the lack of complete information, the
conflict of values among participants of the process, the absence of any
agreed-upon method, and general hostility to planning are only a few of
the many reasons for the failure of many planning programs. As previously
suggested, it is a mistake to conclude that planning is unimportant be-
cause failures in planning have occurred. Despite the lack of accomplish-
ment of desired goals, planning does achieve some objectives, and often has
For a general discussion of the court as a policy planner, see McDougal, Law as a Process
of Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 NAT. L. F. 53 (1956).
15 N. CHAMBERLAIN, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC PLANNING (1965).
11 For a discussion of this theme, see H. CHUDACOFF, THE EVOLUTION OF AMERICAN URBAN
SOCIETY 255-65 (1975).
11 See H. GANS, THE LEvrrrowNEim: WAYS OF Lin AND PoLTICs IN A NEW SUBURBAN COMMUNITY
(1967).
11 See J. CLAPP, NEW TOWNS AND URBAN POuCY: A CASE STUDY OF COLUMBIA, MARYLAND 32-35
(1971). See also R. BROOKS, NEW TOWNS AND COMMUNAL VALUES 8-20 (1974).'
11 A good description of the downfall of NRPB is contained in M. SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY
PLANNING SINCE 1890 407-11 (1969).
50 H. CHUDACOFF, THE EVOLUTION Or AMERICAN URBAN SocIErY 255-65 (1975); H. GANS, PEOPLE
AND PLANS 260-77 (1968); Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home, in THE URBAN CONDITION (L. Duhl
ed. 1963).
" C. HAAR, BETWEEN THE IDEA AND THE REALITY: A STUDY OF THE.ORIGIN, FATE AND LEGACY OF
THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM (1975).
Miller, The Elimination of the American Lower Class as a National Policy: A Critique of
the Ideology of the Poverty Movement of the 1960's, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 260-315
(D.. Moynihan ed. 1969); see J. KERSHAW, GOVERNMENT AGAINST POVERTY (1970); S. LEvrrAN,
THE GREAT SOCIETY'S POOR LAW: A NEW APPROACH TO POVErTY (1969); S. LEVITAN, FEDERAL
AID TO DEPRESSED AREAS: AN EVALUATION OF THE AREA REDEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (1964).
5:' For a general discussion of P.P.B.S., see PLANNING, PROGRAM BUDGETING: A SYSTEMS AP-
PROACH TO MANAGEMENT (F. Lyden & E. Miller eds. 1968). For a discussion of its history, see
Symposium-PPBS: Its Scope and Limits, 8 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 3-48 (1967).
5 See note 33 supra.
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serious consequences even when it does not succeed. Moreover, it is a
mistake to rely on the failure of past planning efforts to avoid attention to
the need for control of present planning efforts.
The failure of the law to support planning is not merely a result of its
disorganization; it is directly related to the ambivalent relationship which
the law has to the planning process. An understanding of that ambivalence
contributes a new understanding as to whether or not the law of planning
has "failed." While law is intended to assist the planning process, it is also
intended to control the planning process by preventing invasion upon es-
sential freedoms, perpetuation of unequal treatment, or facilitation of pro-
jects harmful to the environment. For example, a plan may require the
collection of information which invades people's privacy.5 A plan to beau-
tify a community may require design ordinances which in their implemen-
tation invade the first amendment right of people to lead their own lives.5
In effect, the law is on both sides of the planning process. As a faithful
servant, it is available to implement plans, only to be often checked by
other laws which properly control the planning process and its implemen-
tation. :
Insofar as the law is intended to support the planning process, another
complete dimension to the problem of the proper legal structuring of plan-
ning in society develops. In order to implement planning, the law requires
a theory of "social rationality"-how and in what way man's reason can
be implemented in society. Such a theory requires acute knowledge of the
methods of planning, the organizational setting in which planning is
lodged and the process of social change within the community.
The law may place three kinds of controls upon planning. First, plan-
ning and implementation activities may need constitutional, statutory and
common-law limitations either on the use of coercive force or curbing the
involvement of the government from entering areas in which the govern-
ment does not belong. Second, the law may require the agents of govern-
ment to affirmatively plan where the government has failed to discharge
its obligations. Finally, the law may require that plans and their imple-
mentation come under proper representative control. 7
A central problem of planning law is to draw the proper line between
the dual role of the law as a facilitator and controller of the planning
process. In order to define this dual role, the legal system must be designed
to accommodate and support this planning process. It could be argued that
5 For a general discussion of these issues, see R. BROOKS, PLANNING AND PERSONAL CIVIL
LIBERTIES (May 27, 1976) (unpublishedl. For a discussion of privacy, see Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE L.J. 475 (1968). For one of many discussions regarding the gathering of data, see Note,
Privacy and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Center, 82 HARv. L. REv.
400-17 (1968).
See Note, Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First Amendment, 27 STAN. L. REV. 179
(1975).
51 The entire area of citizen participation in planning is relevant here. For a recent summary
of the literature, see R. BROOKS, PLANNING AND PoLmcAL FREEDOM: A REVIEW OF THE LAW OF
CITIZEN PARTICIPATION (Summer 1976) (unpublished).
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the need to control planners is already achieved by the established laws
which limit the affirmative powers of the government planners, check
them by a horizontal separation of powers and vertical federalism, and
keep them from abusing the liberties and equalities of persons through
legal guarantees of individual rights. Such legal controls are established
primarily through broad constitutional provisions which apply to others as
well as planners. But the development of planning occurred in response to
forces which were not anticipated in the original Constitution, under which
a broad framework of control is not established.
The lack of a constitutional base for the support and control of plan-
ning undoubtedly has contributed to the failure of courts to supervise
planning and develop a coherent body of governing law. The common-law
approach, which triggers court action at the time of implementation and
often limits inquiry into the substance of the dispute at hand, conflicts
with the future-oriented comprehensive orientation of planners, which
scans hypothetical alternatives with the help of a forbidding quantitative
methodology."
The failure of the Constitution and common law to control and legi-
timize planning activities has led to the major corpus of "planning law"
found in statutes59 and administrative regulations. Until recently, however,
these statutory constraints have not been enforced by court decisions. The
history of judicial review of city planning, for example, has primarily been
one of avoidance. Until recently, courts have not only customarily failed
to give the proper definition to a local comprehensive plan, but have not
required that subsequent implementations conform with that plan despite
the statutory requirements for such conformance.
D. The Movement Towards the Legal Recognition of Planning
In the last decade, courts have shown a new concern that the planning
process be completed and implemented. 0 The courts have paid the most
attention to the planning process through the implementation of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1970.6 Despite its focus upon
only impact planning, NEPA and the cases under it are a true watershed
for planning law. In a myriad of cases, the courts have been forced to
For a recent example of.a court seeking to cope with the quantitative methodology of cost
benefit analysis, see Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd sub.
nom. Sierra Club v. Calloway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
The growth of the public law of planning has largely escaped attention of legal educators,
since it relies primarily upon statutes and regulations with a paucity of cases.
1 The entire series of cases emerging out of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1970
is one example of this new court concern. For a good collection of cases, see D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC
PLANNING AND CONTROL OF URBAN LAND DEVELOPMENT (1973).
' As indicated in the text, I believe that NEPA and court review of impact statements
required by NEPA represents a veritable revolution in planning law, involving the court in
detailed review of these impact statements. However, even if such statements are not re-
garded as "plans," the courts have proceeded to review other environmental "implementation
plans."
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structure a comprehensive environmental planning process governing fed-
eral actions and recently have turned their attention to similar state stat-
utes and other planning statutes.2
Despite this recent attention to the planning process, courts have
developed very little new legal doctrine, theory, or commentary explicitly
fashioned to help them in coping with the planning process. 3 Unfortun-
ately, with some notable exceptions, the legislature has been of little assis-
tance to the courts in developing legal controls for the planning process.
Although theoretically limiting the planner's powers, statutes are often so
broadly drawn that they do not succeed in explicitly limiting the planner's
power. To the extent that the planning function is carried on within the
executive bureaucracy, the legislature's and the courts' present failure to
control the bureaucracy means failure to control the planner as well. This
failure results from a lack of legislative consensus needed for sufficiently
specific definitions of policy objectives.. This absence of consensus is ex-
pressed in vague laws, which then results in struggles within the executive,
between the departments of government, and between the levels of the
federal system." Thus, the fragmentation of power within the American
system has resulted in the "accidental" control of planners' power by
preventing the concentration of power in any one set of planners' hands.
This frustration of the formal and legal concentration of powers necessary
to carry on planning does not necessarily prevent the informal concentra-
tion of power either through effective political machines, named special
purpose authorities, international cartels, or uncontrolled public-private
partnerships. The planning of these informal concentrations of power,
however, may remain unsupervised by the law. At the same time, the
reliance upon pluralistic fragmentation of the formal planning process may
also often cripple planning's effectiveness. In short, it may control the
planner at the expense of planning itself.
E. Objections to a Jurisprudence of Planning
The objections to a jurisprudence of planning may result from a vari-
ety of broad views regarding the role which planning should and does play
in modern society. Also, the recommendation for a "jurisprudence of plan-
ning" may conflict with the existing structure of legal thought and legal
subject matters. Thirdly, differing theories of planning create problems for
the development of any unified jurisprudence of planning.
62 For a superb collection of cases and commentary, see E. HANKS, J.-HANKS, & A. TARLOCK,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AND POLICY (1974).
'1: I realize'this is a very broad statement. Obviously, such doctrines as "the scope of review"
in administrative law or the "delegation" doctrine in constitutional law are used by courts
in their encounters with plans. Perhaps what is required is the systematic reexamination of
each legal doctrine and concept as it bears upon the planning process.
"4 For an extended discussion of this problem, see T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AuTHORrrY (1969).
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1. Broad Views of Planning in Society
Many objections to a jurisprudence of planning"l may be found in the
writings of recent social philosophers. Answers to these objections yield
some broad guidelines for developing such a jurisprudence. Perhaps the
most fundamental objection to the attempt to develop a jurisprudence of
planning attacks the underlying assumption that reason through planning
and law can guide human development" and progress. Authors such as
Dahl, Lindblom and Simon have raised fundamental objections to the
feasibility and desirability of long-term planning. They argue that man
does not have the capacity of intelligence for such comprehensive plan-
ning. Yet even these authors recognize that intelligence has a role to play
in the governing of man's affairs. Even if they are correct and planning has
a limited role to play, a jurisprudence of planning should then define the
appropriate limits of planning set, in part, by the limits of the effectiveness
of the exercise of reason within society."
A second objection to a jurisprudence of planning is based upon the
belief that planning is necessarily an instrument of the state and that a
jurisprudence of planning will merely rationalize the already excessive
powers of government at the expense of individual freedoms.1s However, a
jurisprudence of planning need not presume any specific balance between
freedom and planning controls. Rather, any jurisprudence of planning
must define the limits of planning in order to preserve and enhance human
freedom. Unfortunately, there has been little systematic attention to the
problem of balancing freedom and planning in the modern planning or
legal literature.
Thirdly, if planning is viewed, as it often is, as an instrument of
bureaucracy, and if bureaucracy is seen as gradually "taking over" the
world, then a jurisprudence of planning might be viewed as simply the
rationalization of the expansion of one aspect of bureaucracy." Conse-
quently, when a jurisprudence of planning establishes the limits of plan-
-The most basic objection will be the positivist objection to any "philosophy of law." I
believe these objections are convincingly answered in M. ADLER, THE CONDmONS OF
PmLOSOPHY (1965).
11 The limits of reason within society are treated well in M. VANDOREN, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
(1967). Planning, according to Van Doren, would fall under the concept of "anthropogenic
progress through man's use of reason (rather than collective memory) to understand and
control (partially) both external nature and man."
11 C. LINDBLOM & D. BRAYBRooKE, A STRATEGY OF DECISION: POLICY EVALUATION AS A SOCIAL
PROCESS (1963). Since most planning and law is the product of formal authority and law is
identified as general rules, the role of reason can be overemphasized in the study of the law
of planning. Only if law is viewed as partly the result of the irrational play of forces in the
legislative and the development of legal doctrine in the courts, and only if the irrational
obstacle to planning and carrying out of plans are kept uppermost in mind, will this error of
"hyperrationalism" be avoided. There are certain theories of planning (discussed above)
which are adapted to the limits of reason.
F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960).
6 See H. JACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF THE WORLD (1973).
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ning, it must establish those limits within a broader framework of con-
straints upon bureaucracy itself. Legal literature, primarily from the field
of administrative law has attended to this problem but paid relatively little
attention to the planning process itself. A jurisprudence of planning must
discuss not only planning by the bureaucracy but also legal ways of plan-
ning alternative organizational structures which mitigate bureaucratic in-
fluences. Considerable attention in social science literature has recently
been given to alternative forms of organization as well as the decentraliza-
tion of existing bureaucracies. A jurisprudence of planning must include
the planning of and by non-bureaucratic structure.
A fourth objection to a planning jurisprudence is expressed eloquently
in Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society. 0 Ellul views planning as a
tool of instrumental rationality and hence, the expression of the spirit of
an overextending technological society. Even less extreme critiques of the
technological society recognize the dangers of such a society. It might be
feared that a "jurisprudence of planning" is merely a rationalization for
the further extension of technology in society. But any jurisprudence of
planning must define the limits of planning as an instrument of technologi-
cal development as well as controlling the consequences of such technologi-
cal development.7 The recent work of Lawrence and Bruce Ackerman
begins to establish a basis for establishing such limits.
Finally, it may be argued that jurisprudence is limited to general
questions regarding the nature of law and justice, without concern for
specific legal fields or activities such as planning. Hence "a jurisprudence
of planning," it may be asserted, is the improper narrowing of the concerns
of jurisprudence. Such an argument ignores the example of Plato's Laws
and Bentham's Theory of Legislation which establishes a jurisprudence
along with attention to specific laws and legal decisions.72 More impor-
tantly, such an argument ignores the need for using general jurisprudential
insights to assist in guiding the development of specific legal fields. Of
course, any jurisprudence of planning must articulate its general stance on
j. ELLUL, THE TEcHNLooICAL SOCIETv (1964).
Galbraith has suggested that planning in current American society is an instrument of large
corporations seeking for the most part their own growth, autonomy, and enhancement. J.K.
GALBRArIH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967). If Galbraith is correct, a jurisprudence of
planning which ignores the corporate role in planning merely could rationalize the power and
control of the corporate sector in American life. But Galbraith's view of the American corpo-
rate planning system leaves broad alternatives open for restructuring that system. On the
one hand, a proper jurisprudence of planning might suggest necessary limits upon corporate
planning and power as instruments of an uncontrolled "techno-structure." A recent work,
A.N. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE (1973), is one effort to establish constitutional
controls over the corporation. Additionally, Galbraith's recommendations for strengthening
planning in other sectors of society serve as a counterbalance to corporate planning. See J.K.
GALBRAITH, EcONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE (1973).
'2 Although basic jurisprudential questions are admittedly abstracted from any one specific
field of law, the answers to these questions must in some sense explain or be coherent with
the field of law. One other recent effort to develop a general view of a specific field of law is
P. SELZWICK, LAW, SOCIETY AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969).
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jurisprudential issues as well as demonstrate its relevance to the specific
legal field it seeks to establish. 3
A related argument would note that planning law is already becom-
ming organized within separate bodies of law and that, consequently, it is
unnecessary to establish a generic field of planning law.74 Such an argu-
ment for the existing organization of legal subject matters, pertaining to
planning, however, accepts the status quo legal fragmentation of planning
caused in part by the accidental historical divisions of legal subject matter.
This acceptance of traditional legal categories fails to seek possible com-
mon legal principles for guiding all planning activities. Of course, it may
be deemed impossible to construct a jurisprudence of planning because of
the comprehensive scope of the resulting legal subject matter. Yet, every
field of legal subject matter covers a variety of detailed cases, statutes, and
institutions pursuing common principles underlying a multifaceted subject
matter; a law of planning would be no exception. Moreover, such a juris-
prudence should deal with planning and the attempt to implement that
planning-not all public laws, no matter how indirectly related.7"
2. Differing Views of Planning and the Position of the Planner in
American Society
Another set of obstacles to the development of a jurisprudence of
planning law appears to be the differing theories and ideologies of plan-
ning. The broad definition of a jurisprudence of planning must encompass
a variety of different-ideologies regarding the role of planning in American
society.76 Such a broad variety of ideologies would appear to make a unified
jurisprudence of planning impossible, since many different, broad roles for
7 It could be suggested that a jurisprudence of planning is already under development in the
American Law Institute Land Development Model Code. Such a code, however, falls consid-
erably short of reviewing the law of many planning activities. In fact, it rejects a broad
treatment of planning questions. Nor does such a code explicitly weigh the jurisprudential
questions underlying the law of planning, although it contains an enlightened discussion of
land use planning. Nevertheless, a jurisprudence of planning can and must have implications
for such a Code. See ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE (Proposed Official Draft, April 15,
1974).
11 The casebook series for various areas of law tend to establish acceptable categories of
thought for the organization of legal subject matters. Any practicing lawyer knows that
practical legal problems do not come so neatly packaged.
11 The concern over the scope and complexity of a jurisprudence of planning contains another
important objection-the objection of the legal realist to the attempt to develop broad formal
principles of law rather than the specific study of what judges and lawyers and other deci-
sion makers do. Certainly, this study is an important part of the descriptive and predictive
aspects of a jurisprudence of planning. But the study of what judges and lawyers do is an
incomplete jurisprudence without an inquiry into what they should do. See Laswell & Mc-
Dougal, supra note 4.
11 This author believes that an ideological-neutral but broadly normative jurisprudence of
planning is only possible at the most general level. When the problems become more specific,
an ideological position is either consciously or unconsciously chosen.
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planning in American society and many definitions of planning are as-
serted.77
Obviously, different ideologies of planning may have different conse-
quences for the way in which law structures planning. Unlike many fields
of law, the law of planning cannot escape attention to these broad issues.
Aside from ideological differences, however, the legal structuring of
rational planning in the United States and elsewhere encounters more
specific obstacles, e.g., a lack of consensus regarding the appropriate meth-
ods,"8 goals, institutional settings and kinds of knowledge appropriate to
planning.79 As a consequence, there exist a variety of specific methodolo-
gies of planning embodied in existing law and regulations, different treat-
ment of objectives and different formats for planning implementation2 °
One task for a jurisprudence of planning is to review these alternative
methods, goals, settings and kinds of knowledge to determine those which
it is appropriate to legalize. For example, to what extent should the law
specify cost and benefit methods to be required in certain settings?
There appears to be very little comparative assessment of the many
different specific legal arrangements for planning.' Which legal structure
for planning works best? The empirical studies of planning have been
largely case studies, and customarily the specific role of law has not been
examined in these studies." At the same time, many legal studies generally
lack any solid evaluation methodology. The growth and development of
11 Without attempting to go into depth regarding these ideologies here, a brief mention of
them is needed. In Man and Society: An Age of Reconstruction (1949) and Freedom, Power
and Democratic Planning (1951), Karl Mannheim views planning in the context of the evolu-
tion of a free-floating intellectual class which, by its application of rational knowledge, can
discover the principal factors of change in society and can hence attain controls over these
factors primarily through the use of "indirect controls." Rather than basing planning upon
the activity of a free-floating intellectual class, Amitai Etzioni, in his The Active Society
(1968), views rational planning as part of an organized system of "societal guidance" with
the planner as part of that system. Etzioni regards alienation as the major problem in modern
societies and argues for the social mobilization of the formation of group consensus around
important tasks in which centralized planning can assist. More recent approaches to plan-
ning, such as John Friedman's Retacking America: A Theory of Transactive Planning (1973),
reject Etzioni's belief in mechanisms for central intelligence and view planning as a form of
social learning that occurs in locally linked network structures consisting of small, temporary,
non-hierarchical and task-oriented working groups.
7 For a discussion of these issues, see PLANNING IN AMERICA: LEARNING PROM TURBULENCE
(D. Gadschalk ed. 1974).
" For a discussion of the kinds of knowledge appropriate to planning, see id.
For example, cost benefit analysis, impact analysis, program evaluation, comprehensive
community planning, and rational functional planning have all been required by one or more
federal and state statutes.
" A comparative evaluation methodology would have to be employed which seeks to factor
out at least some of the many variables. Most of the work in the sociology of law has been
much more specific in order to maximize the application of quantitative methods. But, unlike
the natural sciences, the results appear to be more trivial.
I sought to explore the role of law within the planned community in my recent book, R.
BROOKS, NEW TOWNS AND COMMUNAL VALUES (1974).
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evaluative research and system analysis may provide for the first time an
appropriate methodology for assessing the contribution of laws including
planning laws.1
A review of these general objections to a jurisprudence of planning
yields a series of broad criteria for a complete jurisprudence of planning.
Such a jurisprudence should: 1) seek to articulate the implication of the
limits of man's reason upon the establishment of any form of planning,
helping to guide societal developments; 2) define the relationship between
planning the various kinds of freedom; 3) fix the limits of bureaucracy and
hence the limits of bureaucratic planning as well as the role of nonbureau-
cratic planning; 4) set forth or at least imply a theory of technology in
society, the relationship of planning to technology and the limits of legal
control of technology and planning; 5) establish the proper legal controls
for "private" corporate planning and the role of increased countervailing
public planning; 6) spell out relationship of general jurisprudential conclu-
sions regarding the law of planning to specific legal fields, which now
include planning materials; 7) decide between, reconcile or explore the
legal implications of the various ideologies setting forth the role of planning
in America; and 8) conduct empirically oriented evaluations of the alter-
native legal structure for planning. Obviously,. such criteria imply a gran-
diose effort which will only take place through the efforts of many legal and
planning scholars over the years. On the other hand, such criteria suggest
the need to intellectually organize such an effort to pursue these questions
over time, and perhaps, the framework for organizing the presently unor-
ganized explorations of the law of planning.
F. Specific Empirical Tasks of a Jurisprudence of Planning
The brief description of the trends of planning activity, the legal insti-
tutions for planning, and the consequent problems of planning law sug-
gests the need for a systematic and comprehensive framework for the study
of the law of planning. Although there are scattered studies of judicial and
legislative trends in certain areas of planning,4 there has been no system-
atic effort to trace the trends of laws and court decisions affecting environ-
mental, urban, economic and social planning, seeking to determine pat-
terns and discontinuities in these trends. In order to organize the study of
these trends, and relate them to community decision making processes in
a predictive way, it will be necessary to explore a variety of models of
planning, urban systems, social change, and economic structure,85 and
view the decisions in the context of these models.
" See F. CARO, READINGS IN EVALUATION RESEARCH (1971).
" Most law journal articles are not adequate trend studies because: (1) they select only a few
jurisdictions; (2) they seldom review the activity at the lowest court; (3) little follow-up
analysis is done; and (4) attention is frequently upon court doctrine rather than outcomes
and consequences of the decisions.
0 The rise in cross-community studies in sociology must be followed by cross-jurisdictional
studies in legal sociology.
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Despite the many case studies of planning, there is a lack of careful
empirical study about what factors affect law officials' decisions about
planning. 6 Such studies require the proper use of empirical research meth-
ods, and, where appropriate, the use of multi-variant analysis and other
statistical techniques to determine which factors affect decision makers.
Such approaches have been taken by political scientists in their effort to
predict Supreme Court decisions, but have not been extended to court
decisions affecting planning.
, Additionally, much of the legal commentary on planning law decisions
falls into the category of efforts to clarify the often conflicting objectives
involved in plans and the legal regulation of plans. 7 For example, the
recent multi-volume study of the laws and cases arising when localities
seek to control their growth is an excellent example of this exercise.,, Un-
fortunately, there is almost no commentary on the law of social planning
or economic planning. The clarification of policies implicit in many court
decisions may benefit from the application of goal indicator analysis to
legal opinions.
Finally, with regard to future trends, McDougal and Laswell state:
"In a policy relevant jurisprudence, expectations about the future will be
made as conscious, explicit, comprehensive and realistic as possible. De-
velopmental constructs embodying varying alternative anticipations of the
future, will be deliberately formulated and tested ... 9 The projection
of future trends in the areas of planning law may be assisted by the cooper-
ative evaluation of planning laws in other countries whose development in
the field of planning appears to be "ahead" of ours. 0
Systematic attention to various policy alternatives is an essential part
of a theory of planning law. Such attention might include: 1) alternative
definitions of rationality embodied in planning, so that decision makers
establishing a planning process would know which alternatives were avail-
able; 2) alternative organizational structures for planning and implement-
ing planning; 3) alternative ways of setting forth the objectives of the
planning process and alternative ways of relating planning processes to
informal "community processes"; 4) alternative ways in which planning
may cope with change, including different models of social change; and 5)
alternative ways in which the law of planning and its implementation can
evaluate both planning and its results. Even with the conduct of these
There have been a number of recent attempts to find the factors correlating with Supreme
Court decisions. For a general discussion, see Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy and the Su-
preme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 168
(1968).
'" The clarification of policies and the resolution of conflicting policies in a just manner is a
necessary distinction which escapes McDougal and Laswell, and I believe is essential. The
relation of law and planning to justice is discussed more fully infra.
N See URBAN LAND INsTrruTE, MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH (R. Scott ed. 1975).
" Laswell & McDougal, supra note 4, at 369.
This has been largely limited to a series of excellent studies of English land-planning law
beginning with C. HAAR, LAND PLANNING LAW IN A FREE SocIErY (1951).
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tasks of a theory of planning law, a theory of planning law must also
conduct a variety of intellectual tasks as part of the normative aspects of
a jurisprudence of planning. These normative tasks will be discussed
within the context of specific subject matters of such a jurisprudence.
III. SPECIFIC SUB3JECT MATTERS OF A JURISPRUDENCE OF PLANNING
A. The Requirements for Rationality in a Jurisprudence of Planning
Planning, in order to be rational, must either apply the substantive
knowledge gained from the sciences or apply systematic rational methods
of strategic planning. The precursor to modem planning theory, Karl
Mannheim, stressed the need for the application of scientific knowledge to
planning, and a wide variety of more recent technological approaches to
planning have continued the tradition. From this point of view, "planning
law" may be seen as establishing a relationship between the institutions
of science and planning, defining the role of the substantive expert in
planning, and regulating the flow of substantive concepts of science to
planning and policy-making. The central question from this point of view
is: How well does the law structure the relationships of science to plan-
ning?
1. Regulating the Relationships between the Institutions of Planning and
Science
The statutes governing relation between the institutions of sci-
ence-research institutes, universities, consultants, individual scien-
tists-and policy-making at the federal, state and local levels has not yet
developed into a coherent body of law. With the exception of Lawrence
Tribe's pathbreaking Channelling Technology Through Law, no case books
have been organized to deal with the subject. The legal subject matters
range from obvious intrusions of science into policy making, e.g., the Presi-
dent's Science Advisor,9 to more indirect but equally vital relationships,
such as participation of scientists on the Atomic Energy Commissions'
Safety and Licensing Board and the new Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The issues raised by these relationships range from issues of academic
freedom on the one hand to the establishment of mechanisms for the
accountability of scientists on the other. 2 The institutional issues custom-
arily do not arise in the form of legal cases, but rather in the design of
statutes establishing institutions.
The now traditional field of administrative law is one of several major
legal fields which has struggled with the definition of the proper role of
"the expert" in modern society, through legal doctrines of "reviewability,"
" For a recent discussion of these issues, see T. GILPIN & C. WRIGHT, SCIENTISTS AND NATIONAL
POLICY MAKING (1964).
"1 These issues may be more likely to be discussed in constitutional discussions of academic
freedom or discussions of policy in higher education.
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"exhaustion of administrative remedies," and administrative rules of evi-
dence. One recent example of the problems involved in defining the role
of the expert within the planning process arose in International Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus13 Under the Clean Air Act of 1970,91 the National
Academy of Sciences (N.A.S.) is required to submit a study of the technol-
ogical feasibility of meeting the emission standards to the Environmental
Protection Administrator." The court in International Harvester was faced
with the choice of whether to evaluate this report and determine its relev-
ance to the Administrator's subsequent decision not to extend the air
quality emission compliance deadlines. In light of the contradiction be-
tween the N.A.S. conclusions and the subsequent decision of the admin-
istrator rejecting the implications of the N.A.S. report, the court reviewed
this report carefully. The issue of the extent to which the court should
review detailed scientific reports was discussed, but hardly resolved by the
court's opinion. In this case, the statute involved did not specify the precise
relationship of the scientific report to the administrator's determination.
The court became a critic of the scientific basis of the administrator's
initial decision, utilizing the N.A.S. report to find defects in the Environ-
mental Protection Agency technique of decisionmaking. Then, on the basis
of this review, the court balanced the risks of enforcing the strict deadline
against the possible benefits derived from meeting it.
In International Harvester, the court was reviewing scientific method.
But statutes, regulations and court decisions may also be viewed as regu-
lating the flow of scientific concepts into planning. For example, the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) introduces ecological concepts
into environmental protection law and planning." Keynsian economic
theory is introduced through such legislation as the Employment Act of
1946.17 Regulations introduce and require the use of a variety of scientifi-
cally derived concepts such as cost-benefit theories which, in turn, are
derived from welfare economics. Yet, a careful review of these theories and
their relationship to the legislation shows a substantial variance between
the law, its administration and the theory it was originally intended to
embody. A study of the "slippage" between scientific theory and its in-
stitutionalization in law is an important area of study in a jurisprudence.
of planning law.
The divergence between the pure scientific theory and the workings
of the law results from the adoption of scientific concepts by the legislature
and the courts with a given series of public policies in mind which often
affect not only the legalization theory but its practice as a planning tool
as well. For example, the history of the Employment. Act of 1946 reveals a
limited adoption of Keynsian theory due to the intrusion of other economic
.3 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1(c)(1) (1976).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
'7 15 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025 (1976).
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policies. The costs of such slippage should be carefully measured; a law of
evaluation may be needed to measure these costs.
2. The Institutionalization of a Systematic Planning Method
The second kind of "rationality" in planning involves the application
of a systematic planning "method" to the solution of normative problems.
Although many such "methods" have been proposed, two major types have
been the so-called "comprehensive," and the "partial pluralistic incremen-
tal" planning approach. Much debate has arisen concerning which method
is appropriate to planning and under what circumstances each method
should be used. Statutes can be found which embody either approach.
More importantly, courts and administrative agencies have been forced to
decide the extent to which one or the other method would be used. In this
context, some of the tasks of a jurisprudence of planning law include the
answering of the questions: To what extent does law adequately establish
one or another method? Should it dictate methods? Does it adopt contra-
dictory methods? What are the consequences of adopting one or another
method?
A comprehensive approach to the impact method of planning is best
embodied in the National Environmental Policy Act, which requires that
in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on:
(i) The environmental impact of the proposed action;
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented;
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action;
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productiv-
ity; and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources
which would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented."
Unlike the situation of comprehensive planning at the local level,
where the judiciary has generally avoided intervention into the plan and
its implementation, the courts have intervened into the comprehensive
planning process of the NEPA. They have sought to define the
"significant" problems requiring a planning process, the timing of the
planning process, the determination of who must plan when multiple agen-
cies are involved, the amounts of data to be gathered, the impacts to be
assessed, the alternatives which must be considered and the kind of analy-
sis of short-term uses, long-term productivity and irreversible resource
commitments."
42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1976).
" See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN TtE CouRTs: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
POLIcY Acr (1974).
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Yet the detailed assessments of the NEPA planning process suggest
that it has "been primarily successful in stimulating after-the-fact ration-
alizations which are examined less by agency decision makers than by
agency lawyers whose job it is to ensure that the agency's environmental
review can survive legal challenge."'00 The reasons for this may not be hard
to determine. Despite the strong environmental philosophy of the NEPA,
the courts ordinarily have chosen to treat it as mainly a procedural plan-
ning requirement. In the absence of the constraints of substantive environ-
mental goals enforced by the courts, the agencies have proceeded on their
own course of action. Nevertheless, whether the NEPA works or not, the
judicial interpretation of that act illustrates considerable judicial supervi-
sion of the planning process.
The apparent irrelevance of comprehensive planning to decisionmak-
ing has led to a strong anti-comprehensive planning philosophy among
planners, planning theorists, and public officials. The adoption of one or
another form of non-comprehensive planning techniques has often re-
sulted. These non-comprehensive approaches to planning have been au-
thorized by laws establishing executive policy planning offices, advocacy
planning, and other forms of pluralistic planning. Common to all of these
approaches is that they are "low visibility" activities from a legal point of
view. Since the stages of the planning process are not articulated in the
laws, no standards of adequate planning may exist and few specifically
defined planning products are required. As a consequence, there is little
basis for contesting the exercise of discretion of the non-comprehensive
planners. In effect, such planning is "lawless" planning, in the sense of
being unregulated by specific statutes. More importantly, because of the
lack of explicit legal structure of such planning, it is difficult to assess
whether such planning is any more effective than its comprehensive prede-
cessor. On the other hand, flexibility in executive planning is achieved and
courts are not burdened with review responsibilities. Perhaps, however, a
more extensive evaluation is needed.
3. Other Sources of Rationality in Society
One way of viewing the law's relationship to planning is to view both
law and planning as two alternative forms of rationality among many kinds
of rationality. In addition to embodying its own form of rationality, law is
an allocation mechanism which allocates different kinds of rationality
within society. For example, when the law curbs the implementation of a
plan through a regulation by deeming it to be an unconstitutional "taking"
of private property, the law can be seen as protecting the market rational-
ity at the expense of "technological rationality." A broad inquiry is needed
into the ways in which the law is allocating the various forms of rationality.
Although this may be difficult to do so on a society-wide level, it may be
possible to do with selected cases studies.
I8 Id.
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Alternatively, the law can be regarded as a unique form of rationality
expressed in judicial reasoning-a case-by-case reasoning which centers
upon the consistent and fair treatment of like situations rather than the
facilitation of most effective techniques. From this point of view, "the law
of planning" may be viewed as the arena for the meeting of two different
forms of rationality: legal rationality and planning rationality. A study of
the judicial review of planning might begin with this starting point.
A third way of looking at planning law within this context is to view
law as giving up its own special rationality and adopting a means of facili-
tating technological rationality. 0 1 To document this generalization would
require a careful trend analysis of the growth of policy-oriented thinking
in courts or the courts granting a discretion to planners.
4. The Limits of Rationality
Planning takes place in both private and public formal organizations.
Within public organizations, planning is based upon a formal grant of
"power to plan." The formal definition of that power establishes the limits
of the affirmative power to plan. Consequently, that definition should be
based upon the intrinsic limits of planning itself.' The limits of planning
can be placed in the context of the limits of government itself. Whatever
the interpretation given to the social contract theory of the origin of gov-
ernment, one of its major implications is that the purposes of government
are limited. The areas of autonomy from government cover a loosely de-
fined perimeter surrounding individual and family life as well as private
associations where an individual must be free to develop his own plan of
life and make his own decisions. If this area of autonomy is not described
as an area of freedom from government interference (which is discussed
below) but rather as the set of individual goods which the government can
only foster to a limited extent (goods such as friendships, family relation-
ships, loves, individual moral qualities, health, and vigor and intellectual
skills), then it can be seen that the affirmative power of planning through
government is limited when pertaining to these individual goods since the
formal power of government may only indirectly contribute to these
101 J. ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (1964).
'* These limits of planning have been expressed in different ways by different authors. One
way is the rather cosmic approach of basing the limits of planning upon an explanation of
the limits of rationality in the movements of history. Charles Van Doren, in his analysis in
the Idea of Progress (1967), suggests a taxonomy of progress in which one major idea of
progress is conceived to be through man's use of reason, either in the understanding and
control of human nature or both. The theorists who believe that progress can come only from
humanity's control of itself may either believe that science itself can understand and control
humankind or alternatively, that science must be conjoined with "benevolence," "virtue,"
"devotion," or "acceptance of responsibility." To the extent that these other qualities are
necessary for historical purposes, planning as the application of science would have inherent
limits. Where precisely these limits are is not discussed by Van Doren. I can envisage a
philosophical inquiry into the law of planning which seeks to fix these limits.
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goods.'0 3 It is this recognition which underlies the reluctance of many to
provide for legal support and implementation in the field of social plan-
ning, i.e., the law of population, education, social services, health, etc. Yet
surprisingly little work has been done to study the proper legal limits for
social planning.
B. The Need for Appropriate Organizational Settings for Effective
Planning
Many planning theorists regard planning as a kind of community and
organizational development-an educational strategy adopted to bring
about organizational change through a collaborative relationship between
an external change agent and the constituents of the client system.1'0 Cus-
tomarily, planners called "change agents" are assumed to share a common
set of normative goals, including: commitment to improvement in inter-
personal competence of persons in the organization; belief that a shift in
values so that human factors and feelings can be considered legitimate;
belief that development of increased understanding between and within
working groups in order to reduce tension; development of more effective
team management; development of methods of conflict resolution; and the
development of "organic" rather than "mechanical" systems are the most
effective approaches to planning.
Stimulated by the demand of various groups to participate in the
planning process, as well as such theories of organizational development,
the response of the law has been statutes, regulations, and court deter-
minations supporting the right to citizen participation in planning, 0 5 de-
centralization of decisionmaking'" and the promotion of new kinds of
community-based organizations. 7 These approaches are just beginning to
receive careful attention from legal scholars. They are customarily dis-
cussed in terms of implementing plans, however, when they may result in
reorganizing the entire planning process itself to accommodate new
participation-oriented approaches.
Meanwhile, more traditional organizational problems continue to con-
front the law of planning. One set of problems derives from the federal
structure and the plurality of governmental institutions responsible for
planning. A second set derives from the division of planning labor between
courts, legislature and the executive. Other problems stem from attempt-
ing to forge new relationships between public and private entities, while
"I This assertion is based upon the extensive argumentation offered by Mortimer Adler in
his recent book, The Common Sense of Politics (1971).
"I The most recent book embodying this approach is D. MICHLtL, ON LEARNING TO PLAN AND
PLANNING TO LEARN (1973).
"I For a recent summary of citizen participation laws, see M. MOGOLOF, CmZEN PARTICIPA-
TON: A REVIEW AND COMMENTARY OF FEDERAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES (1970).
' See A. ALTSHULER, COMMUNITY CONTROL: THE BLACK DEMAND FOR PARTICIPATION IN LARGE
AMERICAN CITIES (1970).
", See H. HALLMAN, NEIGHBORHOOD CONTROL OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS (1970).
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there continues to be argued a need for a new "fourth branch" of govern-
ment for planning.
First, in the development of federalism, a gradual movement away
from local instrumentalities as "countervailing-powers" to the federal gov-
ernment appears to be taking place, 08 and there is an increased transfor-
mation of states and localities into instruments of planning and federal
policy. Second, in the division of powers it appears that all three branches
of government are now undertaking some planning responsibilities rather
than leaving planning to the executive. A major-issue remains concerning
the extent to which the courts should review administrative planning 9 and
the question whether the legislatures and courts are appropriate planning
bodies." 0 A third major set of issues is the growth of public-private plan-
ning arrangements, such as privately sponsored new towns. Finally, argu-
ments for "fourth power" planning instrumentalities continue to be raised.
Questions here concern the allocation of powers and benefits between pri-
vate and public instrumentalities"' and questions about the desirability
of a "fourth planning power ' " 2 remain to be seriously explored.
The complex multi-nucleated structure of planning and the imple-
mentation of plans cannot be resolved into a neat pattern of decision-
making. Differing theories of democracy and its present condition in the
United States make it difficult to reach agreement regarding which ar-
rangement of powers is most desirable. As a consequence, a succession of
different theories of federalism has taken place in the past several decades.
Economic theorists have unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the problem
of which is "the optimal jurisdiction" for planning. And planners have
suggested a multi-factored approach which takes into account the differing
values of alternative federal arrangements.
Realistically, the present legal system governing planning is likely to
resolve its organizational problems through the ad hoc actions of the courts
and the legislatures, neither of which have any clear comprehensive posi-
tion regarding the proper arrangement of powers and jurisdictions. New
and radical constitutional solutions to the organization of powers of plan-
ning are likely to be ignored. Nevertheless, legal scholars and planning
theorists have the obligation of developing new clear and comprehensive
theories of the costs and benefits of alternative organizations for planning,
and discussing which organizational structure might be desirable.
An alternative approach, given the organizational chaos that is likely
to persist, is developing a methodology which, while retaining some intel-
lectual rigor, can still be effective in a multi-nucleated power structure.
IOs See HUTCHINS, Two Faces of Federalism, in CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS (1961).
109 See DAVIS, supra note 21, at 1-25.
, See T. BOYLE & G. LATHROP, PLANNING AND POLITICS: UNEASY PARTNERSHIP (1970) (discusses
the role of planning in the legislature).
See R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOOM, PoLTIcs, ECONOMICS AND WELFARE (1953).
2 See R. TUGWELL, THE EMERGING CONSTITUTION (1976).
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The traditional planning methods which assume centralized decisionmak-
ers and the modification of these centralized planning methods have not
yielded a clear and coherent alternative planning methodology adopted to
pluralism. This uncompleted task of planning theory becomes a present
obstacle in the establishment of a satisfactory planning jurisprudence.
Courts and legislatures have no viable specific pluralistic planning model
to adopt.
C. Enabling the Community to Plan
Planning is primarily an activity of formal organizations within a
community. Such planning, however, customarily is justified as enabling
"the community" as a whole to solve its problems. The relationship of
planning as an instrument of any one formal organization to the com-
munity as a whole, which includes many non-formal organizations, is prob-
lematic. On the one hand, there may be considerable disparity between the
legal rules and plans adopted by a formal organization and the sociological,
ecological or economic reality of the community in which it is located." 3
In order to avoid these problems, legal fields dealing with communities
have adopted pragmatic, positivistic, or empirical approaches. The prag-
matic orientation avoids exploring the relationship between law and the
entire community by focusing upon some narrow and specific legal issue,",
leaving the problem of defining the community unsolved. The positivistic
orientation simply takes "the sovereign" governmental institutions as the
starting point and treats legal problems within this framework."' The em-
pirical orientation studies the relationship between law and the com-
munity as a species of social science," 6 but does not resolve the important
normative problems of how law and the community should be related to
one another. Thus, four specific problems confront planning law in its
attempt to relate its formal organizational structure to the community as
a whole. First, the community and the law must define the community
problems with which it is appropriate for the law and formal planning to
deal, as well as those problems better handled by informal community
institutions. Second, there is the question of how law and planning
should set appropriate boundaries of the community to be served by the
law. Third, when law and planningare seen as part of a total community
system, the problem of where the appropriate intervention points for law
and planning are within the community. And fourth, the very community
purposes of law and planning become subject to question.
For example, the definition of formal jurisdictions by the law, e.g., municipal boundaries,
zoning districts, economic development districts, may not accord with sociological, e.g., an
urban area, ecological, e.g., a watershed, or economic, e.g., market area boundaries.
"I A recent approach to urban law, T. SANDALOW & F. MicHAELMAN, GOVERNMENTS IN URBAN
AREAS (1970), illustrates this approach.
It' Id.
"I E.g., J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAw ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
(1966).
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1. Definition of Community Problems
The law itself may establish, secure, or reflect community standards;
community practices diverging from these legal standards may be identi-
fied as "community problems.""' When a community legislates the solu-
tion to a problem, the law frequently "defines" the problem. The variety
of perceptions of the problem within the community are theoretically re-
solved by the appropriate statutory clause and/or legal doctrine of decision.
A good example of the way in which the law has defined the problem is in
the field of housing planning where the law has adopted census definitions
of "substandard" housing, despite the conclusion of many housing studies
that.substandard housing is, in many aspects, relative to the perceptions
of differing social subgroups.
New inquiry must be made into whether law should continue to define
problems in "norm-deviance" ways or whether more system-oriented defi-
nitions of problems must begin to guide legal development. A "norm-
deviance" approach which permits the recognition that the norms of differ-
ent subgroups within the community differ may facilitate a planning pro-
cess which allows for differing perceptions of "the problem" to take place
and a consequent arrival at definitions of problems that take into account
these differing perceptions.
2. Delineation of Community Boundaries
The law establishes the territorial jurisdiction for formal, planning
efforts within the community by establishing the boundaries of urban,
ecological and economic communities. The establishment of these bounda-
ries, whether by statute, regulation or court decision, is not merely a de-
scriptive task, but also a normative one since the establishment of bounda-
ries results in the allocation of powers and government services. ' 1 The law
adopts different approaches, ranging from the arbitrary setting of tradi-
tional jurisdictions, to the formal establishment of boundaries set by the
rational planning approach of boundary commissions and the informal
adoption of artificially set boundaries implied in models of an urban or
ecological system.
3. Setting the Limits of Intervention into Community Affairs
Given the scope and complexity of the community and, in particular,
urban communities, the location of the maximum "leverage points" for the
intervention of law becomes problematic. On the one hand, planning may
guide law in the search for the leverage points. On the other hand, the law
may presume certain leverage points to provide a solution to community
"I For a discussion of the definition of community problems, see R. MERTON, CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 250-54 (3d ed. 1972).
"' Heskin, A New Approach to Planning Law, in JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
PLANNERS 250-54 (July 1972).
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problems and direct planning toward these solutions. A promising develop-
ment in assisting the location of appropriate leverage points has been the
development of economic, ecological and urban models"9 and the develop-
ment of evaluative research techniques. Models identify in detail at least
some of the variety of variables and relationships to be taken into account
in the application of policy. For example, a planning model which might
guide legal interventions in urban areas is the Forrester model. The relev-
ance of this model does not rest so much in the accuracy of its initial
application which has been criticized, but rather in the yielding of a new
view of the law as that which affects the rate variables in the urban system.
For example, a series of laws may affect the public expenditure rate or the
underemployed job multiplier. Laws would then be grouped according to
their relevance to a particular multiplier, rather than in accordance with
traditional legal subject matters and studies for their collective impact.
But such an approach to the law requires evaluative research studies of the
relative impacts of the law as instruments of public policy. Curiously, only
a moderate amount of legal scholarship has been done within this area,
despite the development of fairly sophisticated evaluation research mod-
els.
4. Establishing Purposes of the Community
The community can be and has been defined as the common purposes
which both law and planning pursue. The original limited purposes em-
bodied in the law of the United States have been expanded to include the
achievement of a wide variety of goals of the populace, ranging from the
provision of health services to higher education. Planning has consequently
been extended to meet most of those goals as well.
In a classic article on planning law, Charles Reich argued that the law
guiding planning has failed to offer substantive definitions of the "public
interest" which is to guide that planning."" This failure, according to
Theodore Lowi,12 ' has resulted from the broad delegation given by the
legislature to administrative agencies. But this failure may be due to the
deeper limitation of planning techniques themselves which, while they
define alternative means for the given ends, have failed for the most part
to define those ends themselves because of a lack of any approved planning
techniques for defining them. Unfortunately, many of the statutes en-
abling both comprehensive and non-comprehensive planning lack sub-
stantive, relatively specific goals set by the legislature to guide the plan-
ning process.
This does not mean that within the legal system as a whole there is
not reflected a framework of substantive goals which can help to guide the
"I For one collection of such models, see DECISION MAKING IN URBAN PLANNING (I. Robinson
ed. 1972).
' Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227 (1966).
' T. Lowi, supra note 64.
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planner and to define the public interest. Definition of the "public inter-
est" within the legal system as a whole sets forth legal standards of justice
for the peaceful guidance of social change, the definition of basic human
needs and the degree of freedoms to be protected. The remainder of this
article focuses upon the way in which the legal system may provide a
context of meaning for defining the public interest.
IV. CLARIFYING THE SUBSTANTIVE SOCIETAL GOALS OF PLANNING LAW
Insofar as a jurisprudence of planning is not merely a descriptive and
conceptual task, but also a normative one, such a jurisprudence must
include the clarification of the societal goals which are often reflected in
the postulates of planning law. The clarification requires not only reflec-
tion upon the specific meaning of substantive values, but also reflection
and judgment about the nature of the moral and legal status of these
values, a status which ranges from non-legal moral values to statutorily
defined policy objectives to statutory and/or constitutionally protected
legal rights.
A. Planning and the Guidance of Social Change
The guidance of change through planning is based upon the combined
factual and normative assumption that evolutionary progress is possible
and desirable partially through the application of human reason.2 2 Given
this assumption, which is frequently controverted, the question then be-
comes the way in which law enables planning to cope with and plan for
the forces of change. Although many forces for social change may be identi-
fied, three forces-the extension of technology, the growth of affluence
and population increase-are often identified as the major engines of
change within the United States.
Legally established systems of planning, with varying degrees of sanc-
tions, have been established to cope with the consequences of these forces.
Systems of law and planning, however, are not organized to focus upon
these forces. We do not have a law of technology, a law of economic
growth, or a law of population increase. Rather, laws are scattered and
fragmented in such a way that it is unclear how they collectively bear upon
the engines of change. Even where there are fields of law dealing with
subject matters related to the basic causes of social change, those laws
frequently treat only symptoms. For example, one might identify national
and regional economic planning law as primarily concerned with the guid-
ance of economic growth,'2 but it is dubious that the law addresses itself
to the underlying causes of commitment to economic growth. Environmen-
tal planners under many state and federal laws are also attempting to cope
"2 For the past Marxian argument on this assumption, see MANNHEIM, supra note 6.
'2 See, e.g., REGIONAL POLIcY READINGS IN THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (J. Friedman & W.
Alonzo eds. 1975).
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with the results of increasing affluence through such methods as "bottle
bills,"'' with little attention given to controlling the pursuit of affluence
itself. One exception is Lawrence Tribe, who identifies the wide variety of
laws which bear upon the control of technology.'" Unfortunately, the his-
tory of the Technology Assessment Act, which he did so much to develop,
resulted in a law manifestly incapable of controlling our technological
machine.' 2 While the control of population through planning law ranges
from the law of national population planning emphasizing free choice to
local population growth policies,'2 no organization of all the laws affecting
the basic population rate has been carried out.
In short, the legal system which is organized to treat the symptoms of
social change is fundamentally a "remedial" law. Since American plan-
ning is organized in accordance with that remedial law, that planning itself
is fundamentally remedial planning. Rather than control directly the fun-
damental sources of change in society, an ad hoc evolutionary body of law
develops to preserve the existing interests which favor the continuance of
the present forces of change. At most, the law and planning mitigate the
detrimental effects of these forces. Such an approach to planning law
adopts a strategy of peaceful control of the consequences of change, rather
than the direct and probably less peaceful control of change itself. In
essence, planning law reflects what Boorstin calls "the genius of American
politics"' n and what other theorists have called "incremental decision-
making."
While there are good prudent reasons for such a legal system, it creates
a planning apparatus which often seems to hardly touch the fundamental
problems in American society. At the same time, unauthorized planning
efforts outside the law, e.g., Utopian communes, which seek to cope with
more basic problems of the society, seem to be unrealistic and irrelevant.
From this point of view, efforts in a jurisprudence of planning law might
be properly directed to the problem of effectively controlling the basic
sources of the process of social change and preserving the peace and
"legalizing" more radical planning efforts which are seeking to directly
control the engines of social change in America.
B. Planning for Common Human Needs
The role of both planning and law within our welfare state is to meet
the common human needs of its citizens and others. Despite the difficulty
of precise definition and despite philosophical argumbnts about whether
there are "naturally unique human needs," such needs are the basis of the
" See W. HELLER, COMING To TERMs WITH GROWTH AND THE ENVmONMENT, ENERGY, ECONOMIC
GROWTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, RESOURCES FOR THE FUTuRE (1972).
121 L. TRIBE, CHANNELING TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW (1971).
IN The Act merely provides a device for advice to the Congress. One example of the growth
of dangerous technology unaffected by the Act is the development of supertankers.
'" Shutz, Federal Population Policy: A Decade of Change, 15 VILL. L. REv. 788 (1970).
' D. BooRsTm, THE GENIUs OF AMERICAN PoLmcs (1953).
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goals which each of us have and are the basis of the goals which each of us
pursue: Given the recognition of these goals, claim may be made for rights
for ourselves and others within our society. These include goals for the
body, mind, character and personal association on the one hand and politi-
cal, economic and social goals on the other. The natural rights to these
goals consist of claims which we can make upon others to achieve these
goals and which others can, in turn, make upon us. More importantly, this
broadened concept of natural rights, based upon the needs of the citizens,
requires affirmative government action in those cases where the individual
cannot achieve those goals. The requirement for affirmative government
action, whether derived from statute or constitutional interpretation, pro-
vides a legal basis for planning; government planning is to be directed to
achieve natural rights which are becoming gradually fixed in positive
law.' "
One of the most recent developments in planning methods has been
the adoption of "goal indicators" to give more precise operational indices
to goals set in the planning process.3 0 This indicator approach performs
some functions analogous to the case law by refining and specifying goals.
Recently, indicators have been used in statutes and court decisions and
more frequently in administrative regulations. 3 ' An exploration of the rela-
tion between goal indicators and more generally established legal rights
remains to be carried out.
The problems inherent in establishing the proper relationship between
law and planning in the process of goal-setting results both from the limita-
tions of Anglo-American law and current planning methodology. Despite
the recognition of a number of natural rights, Anglo-American law has still
failed to establish, on a constitutional or statutory level, the rights to all
of the essentials of life. 32 As a consequence of this failure, planning efforts
to secure these rights still lack proper legal sanctions and legitimacy in
American society. Planners as a profession and planning law scholars
should work to properly establish these rights in the law.
Another problem derives from the nature and limits of legal institu-
The philosophical basis for the entire organization of planning law, I submit, would rest
most comfortably on the philosophical position outlined in several recent philosophical works
of Mortimer Adler. As a Professor of Law at Yale and the University of Chicago, Adler
outlined in the 1930's the proper relationship between law and the social sciences. See M.
ADLER & S. MICHAEL, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1971). More recently he has reviewed
the biological evidence for uniquely human needs. See M. ADLER & W. GORMAN, THE DIFFER-
ENCE OF MAN AND THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES (1967). On the basis of this, he reinterpreted
Aristotle's ethics in M. ADLER, THE TIME OF OUR LIVES (1970). His political philosophy fol-
lowed in M. ADLER, THE COMMON SENSE OF POLIricS (1971).
I" See R. BAUER, SOCIAL INDICATORS (1966).
13' For one example, see 24 C.F.R. § 720.6 (1976) (regulations issued under the New Commun-
ities Act).
12 One recent interpretation of basic United States documents yielding the expanded concep-
tion of government as the affirmative agent for the securing the essentials of life is M. ADLER
& W. GORMAN, THE AMERICAN TESTAMENT (1975).
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tions themselves. As above stated, legislatures often fail to make use of
planning goal indicators to clarify goals because of the necessary use of
ambiguity to effect compromise. 33 In addition, courts are limited in setting
goals because the data often submitted to them in the course of the adver-
sary process is not suited to the clarification of those goals. Moreover,
courts themselves have not decided about the legal significance of various
statutory goal and policy statements. One hopeful sign are recent cases
giving detailed attention and approval to legislative findings and state-
ments of policy. In People v. County of El Dorado, 31 the California Su-
preme Court upheld the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, basing its
decision in part upon careful findings of fact which indicated that the
compact was dealing with an interstate problem, and in part upon careful
statements of policy in the statute under review which was sufficiently
specific to permit the court to reject arguments that the compact was
unconstitutional delegation.
But the failure of the legal system to benefit from the use of planning
goal indicators is not only due to the limits of the legal system. Indicators
themselves suffer from a variety of serious methodological problems rang-
ing from unavailability of adequate data to partiality in the selection of
the index to be used. Moreover, the use of indicators as part of the entire
policy analysis process has been criticized as not accounting for fragile
values and not resolving conflicts between goals and means-ends fluidity. '
3 5
Nevertheless, despite all the problems, planning and law have much
to give each other in their mutual effort to establish and define basic rights.
C. Preservation of Freedom
Mortimer Adler has argued that there are three concepts of freedom
of the individual in society. The first is the unlimited freedom of complete
autonomy consisting of each man's obeying himself alone and able to do
exactly what he wants, i.e., license. The second is the limited freedom of
the residual autonomy an individual retains when he acknowledges the
limited authority of a de jure government, i.e., civil liberty. 3 The third
freedom is the participation in the political processes of government, i.e.,
political liberty.
Curiously, most completed local, state and federal plans do not es-
pouse, in any detailed way, freedom as a goal of the planning process. For
this reason, the field of planning law is concerned with the protection of
civil liberties to the extent that it protects freedoms of speech and associa-
1 For an attempt to develop standards for judging the quality of legislative effort, irrespec-
tive of the content of the policy pursued, see E. FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERIcAN LEGISLATION
(2d ed. 1965).
'l, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 487 P.2d 1193 (1971).
,31 See Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental
Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).
"' For an exhaustive discussion of freedom, see M. ADLER, THE.IDEA OF FREEDOM (1958).
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tion,131 property13 8 and privacy 3' from an overly aggressive planning pro-
cess. One recent example of the law as a possible protector of freedom in
the face of other laws designed to implement plans is Village of Belle Terre
v. Borass.10 The plaintiffs sought to have declared unconstitutional an
ordinance which limited land uses to one-family dwellings, excluding lodg-
ing houses, boarding houses, fraternity houses or multiple dwelling houses.
"Family" was defined as "one or more persons related by blood, adoption
or marriage living or cooking together as a single housekeeping unit. .. ."
Some of the plaintiffs were a group of six unrelated students who were
ordered to move from a house in the zone. They claimed, among other
things, that the ordinance affected their freedom to travel, to associate, to
migrate and, more generally, to lead the way of life they desired. Although
the court upheld the ordinance in question, Village of Belle Terre does give
an example of a court being asked to protect individual freedom from the
implementation of a community plan through zoning ordinances.
But there are laws which less obviously affect the freedom of individu-
als. Conflict-of-interest laws, for example, which seek to limit the impact
of corruption within the government planning process, protect individuals
from the effect of government regulations affected by personal corruption
of officials."' Laws which seek to fragment potential sources of private
power, e.g., anti-trust laws, aim to protect citizens from the imposition of
the private planning of monopolies."2 The legal structuring of citizen par-
ticipation 13 and the requirement of legislative oversight of planning are
areas in which planning law seeks to promote political liberties."'
As previously stated, a jurisprudence of planning should not be seen
as a rationalization for the unlimited extension of planning at the expense
of freedom, but rather the fixing of the amounts and kinds of freedom
permitted within the planned state. Moreover, the paradigm of planning
as a potential threat to freedom and law as curbing planning to protect
freedom has only partial validity. As John Dewey has noted, insofar as
planning itself aims at removing or preventing constraints upon man due
to the unplanned actions of others-to that extent, planning itself is an
' For a general discussion of these liberties, see T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966). For a discussion of them as applied to planning, see R. Brooks,
Planning and Civil Liberties (May 26, 1976) (unpublished paper).
lu For a general argument for protection of property, see G. DEITZ, IN DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
(1971).
I3 See note 55 supra.
416 U.S. 1 (1974).
"' See Staines, A Model Act for Controlling Public Corruption Through Financial Dis-
closure and Standards of Conduct, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 638 (1976).
1,2 For more recent approaches to the control of corporate planning, see R. NADER & M.
GREEN, CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA (1973).
" For a recent discussion of the varieties of citizen participation in planning, see R. Brooks,
Political Freedom and Planning (May 26, 1976) (unpublished paper).
"' For a good introductory discussion of legislative oversight, see F. MICHAELMAN & T. SANDA-
LAW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT iN URBAN AREAs 1094-1132 (1970).
JURISPRUDENCE OF PLANNING
instrument of freedom.' Thus, a zoning ordinance, implementing a land
use plan which results in the freedom of home dwellers from unwelcome
industrial intrusion, is an example of a freedom-producing plan from the
homeowner's point of view. Finally, it may be argued that control through
"spontaneous field" controls which permit administered markets to oper-
ate achieve a form of freedom which can be "planned." The planning of
an effluent-free system for industrial polluters is one such example. The
reformulation of laws both implementing plans and controlling planning
efforts to increase freedom is a long overdue task.'"
D. The Preservation and Enhancement of Nature
The legal control of social change to meet the citizen's basic needs will
have to take place within the ecosystem. That system may be regarded as
either a set of external constraints upon man's actions or a system of
independent nature with its own legal rights, not based upon utility for
man. It could be legitimately argued that the broad outline of planning law
advanced here incorrectly assumes a "homocentric" view of nature, by
which planning is directed at meeting the needs of man rather than recog-
nition of the independent values of worth of nature."7 Even if one does not
adopt an "immanent ethic," the development of a detailed knowledge of
ecology may provide for the first time the basis upon which a new natural
law which externally limits the man's actions can be partially derived.
Environmental planning obviously engages in identifying the natural
constraints upon man's development activities. Hence, the law of plan-
ning, which structures the planning task and implements the resulting
plan, has a particularly important role in establishing nature's constraints.
The legally established planning process may trace the consequences of
proposed interventions ("environmental impact planning"),"8 lead to spe-
cific legal limits to be placed upon man's actions ("standard implementa-
tion"),"4 or lead to affirmative laws in which man's actions may be made
more compatible with nature ("recycling planning"). 0
The issues which emerge in the relations between law and planning
14 This is the theme of Dewey's concept of freedom, advanced in J. DEWEY, THE PUBLIC AND
ITS PROBLEMS (2d ed. 1946).
"4 Ironically, very few plans ever state freedom goals or freedom-related objectives.
", There is a large amount of recent literature on this issue, begun by C. STONE, SHOULD TREES
HAVE STANDING? (1974). A recent philosophical treatment of the issue is set forth in J. PASS-
MORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE (1974).
"' The environmental impact statements required under the National Environmental Policy
Act and other federal and state laws are examples of this approcach.
"I For a discussion of "implementation plans" within the larger context of implementing
planning through law, see R. Brooks, Planning and Implementation (May 26, 1976) (unpub-
lished paper).
,' The recycling approach can be found in recent federal and state solid waste recycling
legislation as well as land management of waste water under the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act.
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in seeking to protect the environment"' are the issues partially discussed
in the new field of environmental law, although this field has also tended
to ignore the unique planning issues involved. 152 These issues include: To
what extent should environmental planning be guided or conditioned by a
right to a decent environment? To what extent can ecological concepts in
environmental planning be embodied within the law? How compatible are
ecological concepts with more traditional legal conceptions? What is the
role of the new "natural law" in planning and law? How should the law
and planning determine who should pay the price of following the new
environmental plans?
V. PLANNING AND JUSTICE
Let us suppose that the National Environmental Policy Act had, as
originally proposed, established a right to a healthful environment. Pre-
sumably, the assertion of such a right not only would have secured court
review, but would also have permitted the court to review not only the
procedure of the environmental impact planning but also whether the
decision was substantively correct..In so doing, the court would have to
decide the level of protection of the environment to be provided as opposed
to the achievement of other values. In other contexts, e.g., the assertion of
a federal or state constitutional right to a decent environment, the court
will obviously have to weigh that claim against the assertion of the other
rights. This problem of the allocation of rights is the problem of justice.
The problem emerges when we seek to balance personal freedoms and the
benefits of planning in the countless possible situations.
How shall we conceive the relative contribution of planning and law
in the pursuit of justice? Planning, like law, may be viewed appropriately
as a means to achieving the common good, the sum total of the goods which
society's members seek. Planning, in its pursuit of the common good, must
be lawful. But the law, whether through omission, ambiguity or internal
conflict between laws, may provide considerable discretion to planners in
their pursuit of the common good. It has been the contention of this paper
that American planners have adopted methods which emphasize a tech-
nological orientation to the effective pursuit of this common good. " 3 These
methods seek to define goods and the alternative ways of achieving them
as a "prudential" selection of the most effective or efficient alternatives.
A review of most plans in the United States will find no definition of
human rights within them. Nor, with the exception of some rare and recent
exceptions, do the plans contain explicit considerations of justice.
51 The best discussion of these issues I have read is B. ACKERMAN, THE UNCERTAIN SEARCH
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1974).
,52 Environmental law does not limit its concerns to environmental plans and their implemen-
tation.
'" I have chosen to use the concept "common good" rather than the more frequent recent
term "the public interest." I am convinced by Mortimer Adler that such an approach is more
philosophically correct. See note 65 supra.
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To be sure, physical, economic and social planning have become in-
creasingly concerned with not only the effective but also the just method
of achieving the common good. Problems of justice in environmental,",
economic,"' and social planning' 6 have recently come to the forefront of
planners' attention. Moreover, planning methodology has begun to pay
more careful attention to questions of justice and equity through the adop-
tion of such methods as advocacy planning. But, despite this incursion of
equity into planning, planning is still predominantly concerned with pru-
dential selection of alternatives.
If justice is universally viewed as the "approbative, obligatory, social
norm,"' 157 there still remains considerable divergence of opinion about the
kind of norm it is, and the relations of law to justice. This author sub-
scribes to one variant of legal philosophy in which justice and injustice are
not exclusively dependent on positive 'law, but rather that justice provides
the criterion for the goodness of law. But, in opposition to Rawls, this
author believes that justice derives from natural rights, which, in turn, are
based upon a recognition of basic goods of man.' From this point of view
justice is an "objective," but not necessarily certain, norm for human
actions insofar as basic goods can be reasonably fixed. 5'
From this point of view, the activities of planning and law deal with
two aspects of justice. One aspect-the legal aspect-deals with regulation
of the exchange and distribution of natural goods in accordance with rights
and duties defined by natural needs. Hence, the search for justice is par-
tially the search for the proper principle of exchange and distribution
through the proper definition of rights and duties. The second aspect-the
planning aspect-refers to the arrangement of power, freedom and goods
" See J. SMITH, ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN URBAN AMERICA (1974).
"u For a discussion of justice within an economic setting, see M. ADLER & L. KELSO, THE
CAPITALIST MANIFESTO (1958).
D. HARVEY, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE Crrv (1973).
0s . BIRD, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (1967).
"' See note 65 supra. An outline of the argument runs as follows: Man is a unique being and
has specific natural needs from which his real goods may be derived. (Issues regarding man's
uniqueness, the "naturalistic fallacy," and the empirical identification of these needs are
obviously raised.) Things that are really good for me impose moral obligations upon me in
the conduct of my private life. These obligations give me moral rights, i.e., the obligation of
others with respect to me. I, in turn, have a similar obligation to them. Insofar as these others
are organized into government, government has this obligation to me; governments are
formed to secure these rights by preventing violation of them by others and to aid and abet
me in my effort to make a good life. Not only do governments prevent and/or resolve conflicts
affecting these rights, but through constitutional limitations, the government itself is limited
from interfering. Governments are further established to support the pursuit of basic goods;
(freedom is one of these goods or the means to these goods). Justice is that relationship
between persons in society so that the violation of all persons' rights is minimized and
achievement of basic goals for all, with a given basic minimum for, each, is maximized.
Positive laws are one of several means for achieving such justice.
Every one of these propositions is highly arguable!
The fixing of such "basic" goals can be done within the context of conflicting cultures and
subcultures, as well as among individuals of different tastes.
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to maximize the common good or the efficient pursuit of that common
good. In any existing situation, it is possible that the planning principle
and the legal principle of justice will diverge.'0 Thus, it is possible to think
of planning for maximizing the effective and efficient achievement of the
common good which in turn will affect the existing form of distribution and
exchange in an unjust way. The problem of coping with the divergence
between planning as prudential maximization of the common good and the
legal aspects of justice is a major problem of a planning jurisprudence.
I would like to posit, without proof, that the proper distribution of
basic goods is the primary standard for organizing our society and the
efficient and effective maximization of the achievement of goods is the
secondary standard for organization of society. Thus, law, which pertains
to the former, has supremacy over planning, which deals with the latter.
Moreover, prudential methods of planning should be clearly subjugated to
the laws' proper definition of the bounds of justice. A planned society
which seeks to replace the legal definitions of just policy with the planning
dictates for efficient maximizing of the common good is an improperly
planned society.
Several broad options remain open for the achievement of a properly
planned society. The planning task can be narrowed within the confines
of legal standards which establish the just distribution of goods. For exam-
ple, once courts and legislatures define the formula allocation for the re-
gional distribution of low income housing, their planners can work out the
details. Or planning itself can shift its technological orientation, incorpo-
rate a concern for both rights and justice, and seek to develop "just plans."
As an example, a plan authorized by state law regulations to protect
the tidelands of the state may prohibit specified uses of land which would
be harmful to others.'"' The regulation may implement a plan to protect
wetlands and hence maximize the public goods derived from wetlands. But
the regulation may also deprive the owner of some value of his land. The
court, under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution,
must decide whether the new distribution of societal wealth and goods
resulting from the plan to protect the tidelands is a "just one."'8 2 The
perennial search for an answer to the "taking question" is thus a search
for a standard of justice in the allocation of developments and rights im-
plicit in the maximization of environmental values.
The legal process of the courts in particular is suited to thinking about
'M The essential distinction made here is that justice is essentially a distributive principle,
whereas planning is largely a prudential one. The problem of justice is who gets what and
how much; the planning question is: which means is most effective in administering specific
goods?
"' Planning will presumably be involved in selecting regulations in a via A vis eminent
domain or market approaches, and determining the most effective regulations.
"' The relationship of justice and law to planning arises in a practical context when planners
are accused of the unauthorized practice of law. See A. HAGMAN, PUBuC PLANNING AND CON-
TROL OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT 346-81 (1973).
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the legal questions of justice and the conflicting claims for justice; it is
properly designed and legitimated to do so.' On the other hand, it is less
suited for a variety of reasons for reviewing the effectiveness of one or
another means or combination of means for achieving the common good.
These general considerations suggest in a necessarily broad and vague
way the appropriate spheres of planning and the legal processes. Insofar
as a problem is dominated by considerations of effectiveness and effi-
ciency, planning is the appropriate vehicle. Insofar as the problem becomes
an issue requiring the fixing of principles of distribution and exchange of
basic rights, however, the legal process and, more specifically, court deci-
sions, are a more appropriate institution.
Such a broad discussion of labor between planning and law may yield
a rough formula for the legal review of the planning process. Thus, the
court in its review of planning activities will focus upon the distribution
and exchange of basic goods aspects of planning. In so doing, courts must
engage in affirmative equity-oriented planning of their own, solicit plans
from the interested parties or review already operating plans.
The legislature has a dual role. It may fix the plans into statute,
ignoring the distributional and exchange aspects of the plan and simply
seek to maximize public goods. But legislative authorization of a sharp
separation between the functions of planning and law is lost. Yet such an
analytic distinction is useful not only to provide an alternate standard by
which the role of planning within the courts may-be measured, but also in
other situations where the relative roles of planning and law are in ques-
tion.
Moreover, the different principles of planning and law may explain
the different modes of reasoning with each use. Because legal processes are
primarily concerned with justice and planning activities are concerned
with the prudential selection of alternatives for maximizing the common
good, differing modes of reasoning are necessarily used.7These conflicting
modes of reasoning may account for the mutual distrust and lack of com-
munication so often found between planner and lawyer, and may explain
the problems encountered when the different forms of reasoning come
together in the same decision making process.
VI. CONCLUSION
This conclusion is the outline of a research and writing as well as a
curriculum agenda directed at the unanswered problems of a jurisprudence
of planning. It is only an outline of issues raised, questions asked, generali-
zations to be tested. The agenda does not resemble any past law or plan-
ning course outlines or agendas of study with which I am familiar. The
agenda proposes a completely new field of law, emerging in reality, but still
unrecognized in the laggard legal categoxies of existing subject matter. I
11 The proper role of the courts in regard to planning is a much debated one. For a recent
well stated middle ground position, see J. SAX, DEPENDING THE ENVIRONMENT (1972).
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hope this new field of law will be institutionalized in casebooks, planning
law courses and consultation: among planning law scholars.
Originally, lists of research questions contained in the body of the
paper were set forth in this outline. But the final product was unduly long.
Consequently, the reader is referred back to the body of the paper, where
the many problems are identified and discussed.
I. Problems in the Definition of a Jurisprudence of Planning
A. The Limits of Past Jurisprudential Approaches to Planning
B. The Central Concepts of Jurisprudence in Planning Law Perspec-
tive
C. The Kinds of Reason Applied to Society
D. Planning and its Relationship to Bureaucracy, Technology and
Large Scale Business
E. Planning Law and its Relationship to Other Legal Fields
II. Specific Empirical Tasks of a Jurisprudence of Planning
A. A Description of Past Trends of Planning Law Decisions
B. Analyzing Factors Affecting Planning Law Decisions
C. Clarification of Community Policies Regarding Planning Law
D. Projection of Future Trends in Planning Law
E. Invention and Evaluation of Alternative Planning Law Formats
III. The Law and Rational Planning
A. Differing Theories of Planning
B. Different Approaches to Planning in Law (cutting across all legal
fields)
C. Law and the Applications of Science
1. Regulating Relationships between the Institutions of Science
and Planning
2. Defining the Role of the Expert in Planning
3. Regulating the Flow of Scientific Concepts into Planning and
Decisionmaking
4. Other Sources of Rationality and the Limits of Rationality
IV. The Organizational Setting for Planning
A. Traditional Organizational Problems
1. Planning and Federalism
2. Planning and the Plurality of Governmental Institutions
3. Planning and Public-Private Relationships
4. Planning and Separation of Powers
B. New Organizational Settings
1. Decentralization of Planning
2. Citizen Participation in Planning
3. Interdisciplinary Planning
C. Planning and Implementation
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V. Planning and the Community
A. Planning and the Definition of Problems
B. Planning and Boundaries of Communities
C. Planning and Appropriate Points of Intervention
1. Law and Systems Analysis
2. Law and Research Evaluation
D. Planning and the Definition of Public Interest
VI. Law and the Guidance of Social Change
A. Alternative Theories of the Relationships of Law to Social Change
B. Alternative Theories of Guided Social Change
C. The Major Forces of Change and the Law which pertains to them
D. Alternative Ways of Structuring the Planning Process to Cope
with Change
VII. Law and Planning for Common Human Needs
A. The Identification of Human Needs
B. Jurisprudential Issues Regarding the Relationships of Needs to
Wants
C. Specifications of Rights of Americans and Their Role in Guiding
Planning
D. Role of Legally Specified Social Indicators
E. The Role of Goal Indicators in Law
VIII. The Law of Planning to Achieve and Protect Freedom
A. The Promotion of Political Freedom Through Participation in
Planning
B. The Promotion of Civil Liberties
1. Through Restraints on Planning
2. Through Promotion of Freedom Resulting Plans
IX. The Constraints of Nature upon Planning
A. Theories of Ecology
B. Nature as a Constraint or as a Source of New Rights
C. Alternative Roles of Planning for Constraints
1. Environmental Impact Planning
2. Environmental Standards Implementation Planning
3. Environmental Recycling Planning
X. Law, Planning and Justice
A. Theories of Justice
B. The Contribution of Planning to Justice as Efficiency
C. The Contribution of Law to Justice as Fairness
D. The Proper Division of Labor Between Law and Planning
